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Abstract 
The human impact on the environment and climate is growing at an alarming speed, as 
about half of the cumulative anthropogenic CO2 emissions have occurred since the 
1970’s. International efforts to limit the rise in global temperature to 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels are undertaken and the reduction of emissions in the energy sector 
plays a crucial role in this process. Based on the decentralized character of most clean 
technologies and the policy-based property of the energy transition, this study 
investigates the impact of (governmental) decentralization and its interdependency 
with institutional quality on the renewable energy development. For this purpose, a 
panel data sample, containing 63 developed and developing countries over the time-
period of 1990 to 2015 is deployed and econometrically evaluated. The results indeed 
verify a promoting effect of decentralization and its crucial relationship with 
institutional quality, although, emphasizing its conditional robustness to alternative 
outcome variable and model specifications. Furthermore, the findings suggest a 
significantly heterogenous impact of decentralization depending on the level of 
development and the associated level of institutional quality. The results imply the 
importance of a simultaneous strengthening of the institutional quality in combination 
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ver the last decades, the human impact on the environment and climate is growing at an 
alarming speed. The anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, mostly driven by 
economic development and population growth, have increased since the pre-industrial 
era and reached levels unprecedented in the last 800,000 years (IPCC, 2014, p.44).1 The rise in 
carbon dioxide is up to 10 times faster than any sustained rise in CO2 during the mentioned time 
period and its concentration was similar for the last time 3.3 to 3.0 million years ago (IPCC, 2018, 
p.54).2 The pace of this trend is impressively shown by the fact that about half of the cumulative 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions have occurred since the 1970’s and CO2 emissions from fossil fuel 
combustion, cement production and flaring have tripled since then (IPCC, 2014, p.45). The 
increased concentration of anthropogenetic CO2 in the atmosphere is the largest contributor to 
radiative forcing and henceforth main driver of global warming. This rise in the average global 
temperature is estimated to be approximately 1.0°C compared to pre-industrial levels and already 
resulted in stark alterations of natural systems, causing increased occurrences of floods and 
droughts, but also a rise in sea level and a general loss of biodiversity (IPCC, 2018, p.53). This 
development, concentrated since the mid-20th century, led many scientists to assess and debate 
the beginning of a new geological epoch – the so-called Anthropocene – underlining the human 
impact on the global climate (IPCC, 2018, p.54).3 Some scientists even refer to the  Capitalocene, 
emphasizing the impact of the specific social structure, rather than the species-wide influence on 
the climate (Malm & Hornborg, 2014, p.67). 
 Regardless of the exact designation of the current time period, the extent of the 
anthropogenic impact on the environment and climate becomes apparent and emphasizes the 
necessity of global actions against the recent developments. Starting with the foundation of the 
Clube of Rome in 1968 and its report The Limits to Growth in 1972,  first concerns regarding the 
relationship of economic growth and the finiteness of the earth’s resources were proclaimed. In 
the 1990’s, with the formation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and the signed Kyoto Protocol – the first international agreement on climate actions – 
introductory negotiations and agreements were undertaken with the intention to limit global 
warming and prevent an even more severe global climate crisis. These international efforts were 
followed by the Paris Agreement, which defines the goal to limit global warming to 1.5°C above 
pre-industrial levels (United Nations, 2015, p.3). Key measure to achieve this goal is the reduction 
in GHG emissions. With the energy sector, including electricity and heat production, being one of 
the largest emitting economic sectors – emitting about 35% of the total global GHG emissions 
(IPCC, 2014, p.46)4 – it is not only crucial to ultimately mitigate emissions in the sector by 
deploying energy from renewable sources (RES), but also pivotal to know and understand the 
determinants of the underlying renewable energy (RE) transition. 
 
Based on the decentralizing and policy-driven character of this RE transition, the crucial role of 
the institutional framework becomes apparent. On the one hand, an equally decentral organized 
state could be potentially advantageous for the transition due to three identified and discussed 
 
1 Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gases (GHG) refer to carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) generated by human 
activities. 
2 During the geological epoch of the Pliocene. 
3 The official “current” geological epoch of the Holocene, adopted in 1855 by the geological science community, is characterized by 
relatively warm and stable climate conditions, starting about 11,700 years ago (Waters et al., 2016). 
4 In 2010. 
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channels: i) The Efficiency Channel; ii) The Democratization Channel; and iii) The Regional Policy 
Channel. On the other hand, the dependency of the transition on public policies and the connected 
institutions emphasizes the relevance of the institutional quality for the transition. Therefore, the 
main hypothesis of the study is that (governmental) decentralization, in combination with 
institutional quality, has a promoting effect on the RE deployment – and subsequent RE transition. 
 
Figure 1 Share of RES –Evolution by Region over time. 
 
Share RES(Non-Hydro) denotes the share of electricity generated from RES, excluding hydro-power.                   (Source: Own Calculations) 
 
The literature on the link between (governmental) decentralization and RE deployment is 
still in its infancy and consequently scarce. It consists of only recent contributions which are 
limited to investigations of the link on a small(er) scale – either analyzing a single country, such 
as Elheddad et al. (2020) in case of China, or a small group of (homogenous) countries, such as Su 
et al. (2021), including seven OECD countries. Additionally, the previous literature is purely 
focused on measures of fiscal decentralization, ignoring instances like the Chinese-style 
decentralization – with large financial (re)distributions to sub-central government tiers and 
simultaneously highly restricted regional political autonomy. This study, on the other hand, 
employs a panel data set containing of 63 developing and developed countries over the time-
period between 1990 and 2015, not only significantly increasing the scale of research, but also 
additionally deploying a more comprehensive and holistic measure of (governmental) 
decentralization. This measure, the Regional Authority Index (RAI), not only incorporates the fiscal 
dimension of decentralization, but also the political and administrative – equally important for RE 
transition. The RAI provides data on the level of decentralization for an extensive number of 
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the Americas, allowing to significantly increase the number of included countries. It nevertheless 
has one drawback, as it does not include African countries – an issue which has to be addressed 
in future research. To verify the promoting effect of decentralization on the RE deployment, this 
study compiles a comprehensive panel data set with a wide range of additional controls. The 
discussed broader scale of the investigation allows for a subsequent analysis of potential 
heterogenous effects – depending on the level of development – of (governmental) 
decentralization, as the level of institutional quality may crucially depend on the level of 
development (Bardhan, 2002). Generally, this supplementary investigation of the combined 
influence and the interconnection between decentralization and institutional quality constitutes 
an equally important contribution to the existing literature – not treated to this extent by the 
previous literature. 
The empirical findings seem to verify the previously discussed enhancing effect of 
(governmental) decentralization on the RE development and, additionally, highlight the crucial 
interconnection with the dimension of institutional quality – as the promoting effect starts to 
unfold from above average levels of institutional quality. This result is supported by the finding 
that the positive impact of decentralization is driven by developed rather than developing 
countries – where the latter are showing significant differences in the level of institutional quality. 
Nevertheless, the findings are limitedly robust to alternative measures of the RE deployment and 
the additional inclusion of RE policies as explanatory variables. Therefore, the findings on the link 
between decentralization and RE development have to be taken with caution and previous 
findings of the literature, confirming strong and unconditional significant impacts may be 
overstated due to more homogenously chosen countries and empirical settings. Yet, the findings 
in general seem to indicate a promoting effect and the implications from it are mainly twofold; 1) 
To enhance the decentralizing transformation of the energy and electricity sector and the 
connected establishment of new forms of energy governance, decisionmakers should seek for 
higher levels of regional authority, and 2) this decentralization process has to be accompanied by 
a strengthening of the institutional quality to ensure a promoting rather than a distorting effect of 
increased levels of (governmental) decentralization – an implication particularly significant for 
developing countries with still below average levels of IQ.   
 
The remaining parts of the thesis are organized as follows. Section 2 offers background 
information on the RE transition, formulates the theoretical argumentation and presents the 
findings of the previous literature. Section 3 contains information on the sample, its variables, the 
data used and preliminary descriptive insights, and furthermore explains the employed 
methodology. Section 4 displays the empirical findings, affiliated heterogenous and robustness 










2.1 The Renewable Energy Transition 
 
s discussed in the introduction, the reduction of emissions in the energy sector constitutes 
a crucial role in the ongoing actions against the consequences of climate change. As the 
most successful clean energy technologies are based on the generation of electricity, i.e. 
solar, wind or hydropower, electricity generation from renewable sources and the employed 
technologies occupy a pivotal role in the current (renewable) energy transition. Additionally, to 
the decarbonization of the energy sector itself, the increasing electrification of economic 
processes plays a key role (Blazquez et al, 2020, p.1).  
Policymakers are promoting the substitution of previously or currently fossil fuel 
powered economic activities, such as raw material processing, transportation or heating, with 
power sources based on RES. One prominent and currently discussed example is the production 
of steel, highly dependent on large amounts of coal and consequently fossil fuel based energy. 
Efforts are undertaken to switch the energy source to “green hydrogen” – amongst other things 
produced from surplus wind or solar electricity. But also, examples such as battery-electric cars, 
busses and trucks show the transformation or rather electrification of the total energy 
composition. All in all, decarbonized electricity generation technologies occupy a prominent role 
in the renewable energy transition. 
When broadly conceptualizing the most prevalent clean electricity technologies, a first key 
characteristic of the underlying energy transition can be directly derived. The technologies, such 
as photovoltaic (PV) and wind turbines, but also biogas and geothermal system, range from micro 
and small-scale applications to medium and large-scale plants. This creates, on the one hand, 
electricity prosumers, who use rooftop PV systems or, in case of farmers, wind turbines and biogas 
facilities, to meet the individual household’s electricity needs. Whereas, medium-scale plants can 
create local or regional electricity-to-demand systems with potentially new stakeholders, such as 
energy cooperatives, municipalities or citizens’ alliances. On the other hand, large-scale plants, 
such as large onshore and offshore wind parks, are even capable of achieving generation 
capacities such as conventional power plants. Although not strictly applicable, due to the 
described range of technologies and systems, we can generally observe a more decentralizing 
characteristic of the renewable energy transition. The energy and electricity generation 
transforms systems from centrally planned systems, such as conventional fossil fuel power plants, 
to the demonstrated more decentralized and diversified energy generation systems (Acatech et 
al., 2020, pp.16-23). 
 A second key characteristic of the ongoing energy transition is its policy driven character. 
Compared to previous transitions, the current must advance at an unprecedented fast rate, as it 
was illustrated in the introduction. Additionally, the transition is not exclusively driven by 
economic forces, but rather under the main goal of reducing CO2 emissions in the energy sector – 
only one out of many properties of energy systems. International agreements such as the Kyoto 
Protocol and the subsequent Paris Agreement further underline the reliance of the transition on 
public interventions and policies. Policymakers have at their disposal a variety of different policy 
tools, such as feed-in tariffs or premiums, tax credits, certificates or renewable portfolio 
standards, to compensate an earlier cost-ineffectiveness of clean technologies, but also to 
immediately stimulate the RE deployment and henceforth imposing a positive supply shock on 
renewable energy. On the other hand, tools, such as carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems, are 
designed to simultaneously impose a negative supply shock on fossil fuel based energy, as these 
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mechanisms increase electricity prices from carbon-intensive energy sources. Next to the 
discussed supply-side influencing mechanisms and regulations, the financing of the imposed 
policies and the consequences of carbon-pricing mechanisms are leading to a negative demand 
shock for electricity and energy in general – caused by increasing taxes and increasing prices of 
carbon intensive energy, products and services (Blazquez et al, 2020, p.2-3).  
 
 
2.2 Decentralization  
  
ecentralization, generally, describes the transfer of governance dimensions from the 
national to subnational government tiers. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) therefore defines decentralization as follows (OECD, 2019, 
p.30): 
 
“Decentralisation consists in the transfer of a range of powers, responsibilities and 
resources from central government to subnational governments, defined as legal entities 
elected by universal suffrage and having some degree of autonomy.”  
 
Consequently, subnational governments consist of their own politically legitimized executive 
bodies and their own administration and assets. Next to a particular decision-making power, sub-
central tiers additionally feature autonomy regarding revenue spending, taxes and financial 
budgets. Furthermore, the concept of decentralization is about reorganizing and reallocating 
relationships between different tiers of governance to ultimately induce more coordination and 
cooperation among them. The caused reciprocal dependence on their part presupposes structural 
and cultural changes within the central government level itself (OECD, 2019, p.30). 
The motivations behind decentralization aspirations are manifold. Factors such as the 
political transition in Eastern Europe, globalization and citizens’ dissatisfaction with the 
government and their pursuit for, among other things, accountable governance systems can be 
seen as contributing drivers. But also, the information revolution and divisive politics may play 
an important part in the ongoing decentralization trends over the last decades (Ivanyna & Shah, 
2012, p. 2). 
 
The process of decentralization, as discussed above, is from a multidimensional character and 
consists of three main dimensions; fiscal, political and administrative decentralization. All three 
facets are interlinked, mostly depend on each other and rarely occur as independent phenomena. 
Political Decentralization, in this context, lays out the legal basis, implying a new distribution of 
political powers to sub-national or sub-central tiers of government. The objectives behind such 
delegation of power can be various, as, for example, the strengthening of democracy by redefining 
the selection procedure of subnational administrators – i.e. through regional elections instead of 
appointments by the central government.  
Administrative Decentralization, on the other hand, involves the reorganization and 
reassignment of administrative tasks and functions – such as planning, financing and management 
decisions – among different levels of governance. The main objectives behind such 
administrational reorganization are driven by considerations regarding increased efficiency, 
effectiveness and transparency of a nation’s government system – initiated by research of Oates 
with his 1972’s seminal paper regarding the efficiency of fiscal decentralization. 
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Finally, Fiscal Decentralization depicts the (re)assignment of fiscal responsibilities 
between central and sub-central levels of government, such as taxing and spending autonomies. 
In this context, higher levels of fiscal decentralization imply increased amounts of financial 
resources for lower government tiers, but also greater autonomy in financial management 
decisions – i.e. tax base, rate or spending decisions (OECD, 2019, p.31). 
 
 
2.3 RE Transition, Decentralization & the Institutional Framework 
 
ased on the previously discussed characteristics of the renewable energy transition, i.e. 
the decentralizing effect and its policy focus, the central role of the institutional framework 
becomes apparent. The increasingly decentralized character of the energy sector, 
resulting from the rising share of small and medium-sized energy and electricity projects, raises 
the question if a similarly decentral organized state or government system is advantageous – 
compared to a more centrally organized one. At the same time, the dependency of the transition 
on public institutions and policies emphasizes the significance of the quality of the institutions 
itself. Consequently, the main hypothesis of the here presented work is that governmental 
decentralization has an enhancing effect on the RE development, i.e. the renewable energy 
transition. This hypothesis is based on several mechanisms through which governmental 
decentralization is potentially positively influencing the RE deployment, which are discussed in 
detail below. Additionally, the crucial and contemporaneous role of the institutional quality itself 
is accounted for by additionally making the hypothesis that institutional quality, too, has a 
promoting impact on the RE development. Here, the focus lies on its general relationship and 
interactions with governmental decentralization, as a decentral organized state itself not 
necessarily implies or rather generates a promoting effect on the RE deployment. 
 
 
2.3.1 Governmental Decentralization 
 
here are three key mechanisms through which (governmental) decentralization is 
potentially promoting the RE deployment, which are based on considerations regarding 
efficiency, democratization and regional policies. 
The Efficiency Channel directly rests on the so-called “Decentralization Theorem” from Wallace E. 
Oates (1972) which constitutes that “in the absence of cost-savings from the centralized provision 
of a good and of inter-jurisdictional externalities, the level of welfare will always be at least as high 
(and typically higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of consumption are provided in each jurisdiction 
than if any single uniform level of consumption is maintained across all jurisdictions” (Oates, 
1972, p. 54). Due to the heterogeneity of preferences among sub-national or local territories, the 
government structure should be decentralized to achieve a higher sensitivity and efficiency 
regarding the specific needs and environments of the individual regions (Oates, 1999, p.1122). 
This general mechanism of higher efficiency in delivering public services can be directly applied 
to the specific topic of RES, due to the earlier discussed characteristic. Especially, compared to the 
spatial bureaucratic requirements of fewer and centralized energy facilities, which can potentially 
be easily condensed and accomplished by central authorities, the large, rapidly growing and 
geographically distributed number of RES plants and facilities can be potentially better processed 




are better informed and more efficient in the approval processes. Poggi et al. (2018) emphasize 
the complex and demanding balancing act of the implementation of RES plants, between land use 
and protection of the environment and stress the link of the implementation of RES and the local 
decision-making process for an efficient, balanced and sustainable zoning in rural areas. 
Indications that more decentralized governments are potentially better adjusted for the 
requirements of increasing RE deployment. 
 The Democratization Channel is considered to be an essential part of political 
decentralization, as the vertical division of power is enhancing communication tools and the 
involvement in formulating policies and is thereby promoting active participation and 
engagement of local citizens (Moisiu, 2014, pp.460-461). This mechanism is shown in the 
increasing importance of so-called citizen-owned or community energy projects – local energy 
investments which are installed and managed individually or by local communities and initiatives 
(van der Schoor & Scholtens, 2019). Next to ‘grassroots’ energy projects of citizens, also the 
significance of local or municipal utility corporations is increasing in the transition process. So, 
for example, in Germany, where over the last two decades several earlier privatized local utility 
companies were remunicipalized – in some cases after the active involvement of citizens through 
referendums. In just seven years over 72 new local power companies were founded which depict 
a key facilitator of the German energy transition, as many municipalities set ambitious targets to 
achieve 100% renewable energy or zero-impact communities. As the overall objective of 
remunicipalization is directly linked to the constitutional right of municipal self-government and 
implies autonomously developing local infrastructure, the central role of decentralization for this 
process has to be emphasized (Wagner & Berlo, 2017, p.398). 
 The Regional Policy Channel, the third mechanism through which decentralization is 
potentially enhancing RE deployment, is based on heterogenous regional interests and the 
resulting RE policies. As emphasized by Poggi et al. (2018), the energy transition is providing 
substantial potentials for rural and peripheric areas. Due to low population densities and available 
land for the implementation of RES facilities, like solar parks or wind farms, these areas can 
benefit from the increasing extension of RES. But also on a larger regional level the opportunities 
for structurally weak regions are large, as multiple studies have shown the positive impact of RES 
on regional economic performances (for an overview see Jenniches, 2018). Sub-national 
authorities, when equipped with sufficient political and fiscal power, can define their own RES 
strategies and policies, independent from the central government line, as shown by the German 
Federal States (Ohlhorst, 2013, pp.52-54). Additionally, Melica et al. (2018) stress the vital role of 
regions and provinces in supporting local and municipal participation in the energy transition 
process, due to motivating and coordinating potentials. 
 
 
2.3.2 Institutional Quality 
 
nstitutional Quality, generally, represents a collective term for the goodness or efficiency of 
different dimensions of a country’s institutional framework, ranging from levels of corruption 
or democratization to the administration’s bureaucratic quality or efficiency. The previously 
discussed energy democratization process, potentially enhanced by political decentralization, is 
fundamentally political and exhibits strong political tensions. The high complexity of the 
development demands strong coordination and participation of the public sector (Burke & 
Stephens, 2018). Next to this, also the previously discussed policy-driven character of the RE 
transition emphasizes the relevance of the institutional framework’s quality. The new and locally 
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organized licensing processes, with the discussed novel forms and increasing amounts of 
entrepreneurs and stakeholders, but also the connected substantial flows of funds – in form of 
subsidies – can potentially give rise to criminal activities and corruption, leading to the 
exploitation of the public policy structures (Gennaioli & Tavoni, 2016). This emphasizes the 
supplementary importance of the institutions’ quality, next to the impact of governmental 
decentralization for the RE transition. Accordingly, Uzar (2020) derives different channels 
through which an increasing institutional quality potentially positively affects the RE 
development. 
 Corruption is one of the most significant dimensions of institutional quality. High levels of 
corruption hereby negatively influence the level of RE investment by either affecting the response 
of politicians to the citizens’ environmental preferences, as officials are prone to maximize their 
own interests, or, additionally, through the mechanism that high levels of corruption potentially 
favor the influence of lobby groups, especially lobbies of traditional (conventional) energy 
companies (Uzar, 2020, p.593). Regarding this mechanism the empirical literature finds, for 
example, that high levels of corruption and political instability cause a loosening of environmental 
policies (Frederiksson & Svensson, 2003). These weakened environmental regulations, on the 
other hand, can impair RE investments. 
 Democracy is another crucial component of the institutional quality. Institutional 
transparency, freedom of information and speech, but also citizens’ democratic participation in 
general facilitate people to find out about environmental issues, express their demands freely and 
put pressure on governments to improve the quality of their environment (Payne, 1995). 
Opposingly, in autocratic societies, elections and environmental regulations can be strongly 
influenced by lobby or interest groups, as the citizens’ rights to vote and be elected are restricted 
and universal and free debates on basic topics, but also the environment are missing and 
repressed (Sequeira & Santos, 2018). 
 From an impartiality perspective, the Bureaucratic Quality constitutes a pivotal role. 
Generally, the quality of the bureaucratic system and its agents is from central importance for the 
planning, implementation and supervision of environmental policies, especially relevant 
regarding the policy-driven renewable energy transition (Ringquist, 1993). Furthermore, 
increases in bureaucratic quality are hereby implying improved decision making autonomy of 
bureaucrats and therefore constitute their resilience in the face of political power and pressure 
(Law et al., 2015). This issue is from crucial significance and enables the possibility that for the 
society not beneficial policies, initiated by the influence of interest groups, can be prevented or 
redesigned (Acemoglu et al., 2001). 
Finally, institutional quality, more precisely Law and Order, is likely to have a RE 
deployment promoting effect, as “RE projects, like other types of investment projects, benefit from 
general political stability, sound regulatory frameworks, effective governance and secure 
property rights” (Brunnschweiler, 2010, p.251). Guaranteeing judiciary independence, the rule of 
law, property rights and enforcing contracts in general are economic activity and investment 
promoting factors, crucial for high-cost investments such as in RES (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005). 
Having these basic legal conditions not fulfilled generates an environment of uncertainty, a key 
inhibiting condition for investors, reducing or stopping new (RE) investments (Uzar, 2020). 
Additionally, the institutional quality in general could provide information about and be linked 
with the financial sector development in particular which is from crucial relevance due to the 




2.4 Other Determinants of RE Deployment 
 
ext to key hypotheses of this work, the promoting effect of governmental decentralization 
and its interaction with institutional quality on the RE deployment, other RES 
determinants of the empirical literature are examined – to ultimately empirically control 
for additional influences. Following Bourcet (2020), the remaining empirical determinants, next 
to the previously discussed political dimension, can be divided into five categories, dominated by 
the category of economic variables. Here, income, mostly taken as GDP per capita, is the most 
commonly used variable. It is argued that increases in income potentially lead to a higher energy 
consumption, including the consumption from RES (Bourcet, 2020, p.7). Furthermore, some 
authors argue that higher income could increase the financial means and resources for 
investments into the capital intensive medium and large-scale RE plants and projects (Pfeiffer & 
Mulder, 2013). Some authors even directly include variables connected to the development of the 
financial or banking sector, based on the same intuition and expected influence. Additionally, 
higher levels of income could more efficiently fund regulatory incentives supporting RE 
deployment. All argumentations state a positive expected impact on the RE development, with an 
important relativization, as from a certain income threshold the impact could be indeed negative, 
due to a lacking ability of RES to immediately meet increases in the energy demand (Cadoret & 
Padovano, 2016). Another included variable is the price of fossil fuel energy, emphasizing that 
fossil and renewable energy sources are potential substitutes. This implies that increasing fossil 
fuel prices are expected to lead to decreasing fossil fuel consumption and henceforth to increasing 
RE deployment – a so-called substitution effect (Sadorsky, 2009b). Nevertheless, there is no clear 
consensus about this relationship in the literature. The same applies for the influence of general 
energy or electricity prices on the RE deployment, another determinant used in the empirical 
literature (Bourcet, 2020, p.7). Regarding a technological dimension, some authors include 
controls for the size of international flows, such as trade openness or foreign direct investments 
(FDI), to depict technology and knowledge transfers. A more open economy is expected to have a 
positive influence on the RE deployment, although the impact might crucially depend on 
otherwise connected determinants, like the general level of human capital or environmental 
regulations (Pfeiffer & Mulder, 2013). 
 Environmental variables depict another category of determinants. These variables are 
mostly related to GHG or CO2 emissions and are used as substitutes for environmental concerns 
and degradation, leading to the expectation that increasing emissions positively affect the RE 
deployment. Opposingly, Marques & Fuinhas (2011b) argue that a negative impact of increasing 
emissions on RES could be explained by the indifference of societies regarding environmental 
issues, upholding the engagement with conventional and fossil fuel energy forms. According to 
Valdés Lucas et al. (2016) the effect of strong fossil fuel lobby groups balances out the 
environmental friendly sentiments and policies in the society. 
 Furthermore, energy variables are included in empirical analyses, controlling for country 
specific characteristics of the energy sector. One frequently included variable is the total energy 
(electricity) consumption with a rather unclear expected effect on RE deployment, as increases in 
the consumption could be met with both energy sources (Bourcet, 2020, pp.7). Another variable, 
the weight of other sources in the energy and electricity mix, is expected to have a negative impact, 
based on the idea of a strong lobby effect of the existing conventional fossil fuel based energy 
technologies and their past and present dominance in terms of investment or employment 
(Marques et al., 2010). But also the low carbon intensity of nuclear and hydro power implies that 
an extensive deployment of such has an expected negative effect on the RE development  (Pfeiffer 
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& Mulder, 2013). The issue of energy security, represented by variables such as energy import 
dependency or electricity imports, has an expected positive effect on the RE development, in the 
sense that decreasing energy imports, in order to achieve energy self-sufficiency, have an 
enhancing effect on the deployment of RES (Marques et al., 2010). 
 As analyzed before, the renewable energy transition is characterized to be policy driven. 
Based on this consensus in the literature, also regulatory variables, next to the discussed political 
dimension, are expected to have a positive effect on the RE deployment. These regulatory 
variables are mostly linked to RE support policies which are expected to generally have a 
supporting impact on the RE development. In the literature this relationship is either investigated 
by including diverse categories of support policies, on the aggregate or rather country wide level, 
or by analyzing individual support measures on the disaggregate level (Bourcet, 2020, p.8). 
 Finally, demographic variables are used as determinants, even though to a lesser extent, to 
control for population size or growth, whereas the expected sign is rather unclear. Increases in 
population indeed increase the energy demand, although, if the population growth is too high, 




2.5 Findings of the Literature 
 
ollowing Bourcet (2020), Table 1 shows an overview of the empirical findings on the 
traditional determinants of RE deployment in the literature. Concerning only a few 
determinants consensus emerges in the literature. First, a positive influence of RE support 
policies, Kyoto Protocol ratifying countries and population size, and, second, a negative impact of 
lobby effects from conventional (fossil fuel) energy sources. Regarding the remaining 
determinants, deviating results are found, depending on the individual research settings and 
scopes. Additionally, due to the usage of a variety of measures for RE deployment as the 
dependent variable – ranging from per capita levels, through shares of energy supply and energy 
consumption, to installed capacities – the results are further divergent, as the determinants’ 
influences can vary significantly, depending on the exploited measure (Bourcet, 2020). 
 
Bourcet (2020), based on the conducted systematic literature review, concludes that, overall, the 
inclusion of institutional quality variables suggests a positive relationship to RE deployment. 
Similarly, Mehrara et al. (2015) find that political stability positively affects the RE consumption, 
retrieved from an empirical analysis of traditional and institutional drivers in Economic 
Cooperation Organization (ECO) countries from 1992 to 2012.5 In case of the European Union, 
Cadoret & Padovano (2016) analyze the political factors affecting RE deployment, additionally 
comparing their explanatory power to economic and environmental determinants. They find that 
lobbying negatively, whereas measures of government quality and left-wing parties positively 
affect RE deployment. Gatzert & Kosub (2017), on the other hand, study policy and regulatory 
risks determinants of RES investments, suggesting that both risk dimensions are important for 
investments in RES. Regarding the relationship between democracy and RES, Sequeira & Santos 
 
5 The ECO, established as Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in 1964 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, is an 
intergovernmental regional organization encompassing countries from Europe, Caucuses and Central Asia, Middle East and South 
Asia, connecting Russia to the Persian Gulf and China to Europe. The overall objective of the Organization is the sustainable economic 
development of its Member States and the Region as a whole. Today it consists of ten countries, additionally including Afghanistan, 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (ECO, 2021). 
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(2018) conduct a literature review and a subsequent empirical application of more than 100 
countries and find that democracy positively affects RE consumption. Finally, Uzar (2020) is 
examining the influence of institutional quality on RE consumption in case of 38 developing and 
developed countries from 1990 to 2015 and shows that institutional quality enhances RE 
consumption. And Mahjabeen et al. (2020) find that a powerful institutional framework is a crucial 
requirement to transform the economy towards more RES and improved environmental 
conditions. 
 
Table 1  Empirical Findings for main independent Variables by types of samples of Countries. 
Independent Variables Global Developing Developed(European) Developed (Global) 
Socio-Economic Variables     
Income NC + - NC 
Fossil Fuel Prices NC NC NC NC 
Local Financial Sector NC (NC)   
Energy/Electricity Prices (NC) (-) (NC) (NC) 
International Flows NC (NC)   
Population Size (+) (+) (-)  
     
Environmental Variable     
CO2 Emissions NC NC - NC 
     
Energy Variables     
Energy/Electricity Consumption NC (NC) (+) NC 
Other Sources in the Mix - (NC) - (NC) 
Energy Security NC  - (NC) 
Fossil Fuel Production (NC) (NC)  (NC) 
     
Regulatory Variables     
RE Support Policies NC (+) (+) NC 
Kyoto Protocol (NC) (+) (NC) (NC) 
     
Political Variable     
Institutional Quality (NC) (NC) (+)  
Amended from Bourcet (2020). “NC” stands for Not Clear, implying that no clear relationship was found in the analyzed papers. 
“+” and “–“ represent a positive and negative impact of the variable, respectively. Results in parentheses relate to less than 5 
papers with the independent variable of interest.  
 
Most of the empirical literature regarding (governmental) decentralization is focused on its impact 
on various environmental quality or policy indicators rather than the direct influence on RE 
deployment. For example, Zhang et al. (2017) use panel data on 29 Chinese provinces to analyze 
the impact of fiscal decentralization on environmental policies – in order to investigate the ‘green 
paradox’. The authors find that policies alone can promote reductions in emissions, but that the 
Chinese fiscal decentralization is opposingly promoting higher emissions – the just described 
green paradox (Zhang et al., 2017). The impact of fiscal decentralization on CO2 emissions, also 
for China, is investigated by Cheng et al. (2021). The authors find that technological innovation, 
fiscal decentralization and globalization negatively affect CO2 emissions, evidence against the 
previously discussed green paradox and in favor for a positive impact of decentralization on 
environmental parameters (Cheng et al., 2021). 
A more systematic approach is contributed to the literature by Brown et al. (2015). This 
paper from the Renewable Energy and Decentralisation (READ) project establishes the common 
foundations of the linkage between decentralization and RES and emphasizes the crucial role of 
local and decentralized energy governance (Brown et al., 2015). On an applied level the literature 
is marked by a couple of case studies. One investigates different municipal energy planning 
strategies in Denmark, concluding that both spheres, centralization and decentralization, are 
needed to perform a synthesis between the central and municipal energy planning strategies 
(Sperling et al., 2011). The other case study investigates the relationship and complex 
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interdependencies of both aspects, applying the topic on Kenya and Malawi – as both countries 
are facing a decentralization process. The authors conclude that the effect of decentralization is 
rather mixed and crucially depends on the individual political environments (Zalengera et al., 
2020).  
The empirical literature on the direct link between decentralization and RES is sparse. 
Elheddad et al. (2020) analyze the impact of fiscal decentralization on the total energy 
consumption – measured as electricity consumption in million kWh – of 31 Chinese provinces 
between 2006 and 2015, concluding that fiscal decentralization shows a non-linear relationship 
with energy consumption (U-shape), first increasing and then decreasing the consumption. The 
most relevant study for the present work, on the other hand, is Su et al. (2021), incorporating both 
fiscal decentralization and political risk, a potential proxy for institutional quality, as new 
determinants of renewable and non-renewable energy consumption – measured as the 
percentage of the total energy consumption. The authors apply an time-series focused empirical 
model on seven OECD countries over the time period of 1990 to 2018 and the results show that 
fiscal decentralization, decreased political risk and eco-innovation promote RE consumption (Su 
et al., 2021). Generally, as the empirical literature review shows, the previous investigation of the 
link between (governmental) decentralization and RE deployment is limited to only individual or 
a small number of countries – more importantly developed countries –, is ignoring the potentially 
relevant interdependency between decentralization and institutional quality and is focusing on 
the fiscal dimension of decentralization only. 
 
Consequently, this research contributes to the literature by, generally, extending the scarce 
literature on the relationship between decentralization and RE deployment, by extending the 
scope to a wider and more heterogenous range of selected countries. Additionally, in contrast to 
earlier research which focused on fiscal decentralization, a different measure for the level of 
decentralization is applied, better incorporating the different dimensions of (governmental) 
decentralization. Finally, the influence of institutional quality and its relationship with 






n contrast to the discussed previous literature, which employed data on individual or small 
samples of countries and used panel data time-series approaches to investigate the impact of 
decentralization or institutional quality on the RE deployment, this study focuses on the 
inclusion of a wider and more heterogenous range of countries into the analysis. In this regard, if 
the number of panels and the heterogeneity of such increases, time-series oriented approaches 
seem to pose difficulties to be adequately applied. The study deploys a data sample containing of 
63 developed and developing countries from five regions of the world, namely broader Europe, 
Asia, Oceania and the Americas. Table 5 of the Appendix contains a detailed overview on the 
included countries. The choice of countries is mainly influenced by data availability issues. As the 
measures for decentralization and institutional quality depict the main variables of the 
investigation, the countries are included depending on the data availability of the individual 
indicators. According to the aim of the study and the discussed characteristics of the sample, a 
I 
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panel data sample with five-year spans is build which is strongly balanced, whereas the period of 
investigation stretches from 1990 to 2015. 
 
 
3.1 Variables & Data Sources 
3.1.1 Outcome Variables 
 
he empirical literature on the determinants of RES utilizes a variety of measures as 
dependent variables – i.e. the RE deployment. The main dependent variable of this study 
is the Share of RES which denotes the share of electricity generated from renewable energy 
sources – in relation to the total electricity generation. This specification operates as the 
benchmark in the later applied robustness check, as the measure best incorporates the underlying 
electricity mix characteristics. It is from relative nature and takes into account all dimensions of 
potential determinants of the electricity demand; the population, the energy consumption and the 
composition of the energy sector. In the case of this measure as the dependent variable, changes 
in such can interpreted in the most consistent manner. Additionally, to the above discussed 
dependent variable Share of RES for the main empirical investigation, two further measures are 
considered in the analysis as a robustness check. On the one hand, the RES Generation in absolute 
terms and, on the other hand, the RES Generation per Capita. The former is measured in billion 
kWh and the latter in kWh per inhabitant – derived by the division of the absolute generation by 
the population. Generally, all discussed measures do not include electricity generated from hydro-
power facilities, such as dams or pumping power plants. There are two main reasons for the 
exclusion of these energy sources. First, compared to the earlier discussed other clean electricity 
technologies, hydro-power constitutes a rather old technology, already employed for a long time 
period. The focus of this study though, lies on the development and determinants of the recently 
employed technologies, such as solar PV or wind turbines. And, second, unlike these technologies 
– which are theoretically unboundedly installable – the technology of hydro power shows 
limitations regarding this matter due to space and geographical dimensions. All electricity data is 
retrieved from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). The principal agency of the U.S. 
federal statistical system collects and analyzes independent and impartial energy information to 
support policymakers and markets and to promote public understanding of energy, especially its 
interactions with the environment and economy. The administration has detailed data on 
electricity, energy, emissions, fuels, demographics and economics for the USA, but also for 230 
current (and former) jurisdictions worldwide on monthly and annual basis (U.S. EIA, 2021).6 
 
 
3.1.2 Regional Authority Index 
 
overnmental Decentralization, the main determinant of this study, is proxied by the 
Regional Authority Index (RAI), based on Hooghe et al. (2016) which (now) covers 96 
countries from 1950 through 2018 on an annual basis. This index measures the authority 
in different types of ruling exercised by regional governments within their countries. Regional 
authority is hereby composed by two types of ruling, which are the self-rule and the shared-rule. 
The former indicates the authority exercised by a sub-national or rather regional government 
 




over those who live in the region and the latter depicts the authority exercised by a region or its 
representatives in the country as a whole. Both dimensions are each disaggregated in additional 
sub-dimensions, consisting of indicators related to political, fiscal and administrative dimensions, 
such as the political or fiscal autonomy or control, respectively. The main advantage of using the 
RAI as a measure of the level of decentralization is the just described multidimensional 
characteristic of the index. As indicated in the literature review, all empirical studies related to 
the influence of decentralization on magnitudes of environmental issues, such as emissions or the 
RE deployment, have used measures for fiscal dimensions only. But, examples like the Chinese-
style Decentralization, with its larger distribution of financial means to sub-central units and 
simultaneously highly restricted regional political autonomy (Zhang, 2006), emphasize the 
utilization of a more holistic measure of governmental decentralization. The index is composed 
by the addition of the individual sub-dimensions and ultimately the dimensions of self-rule and 




3.1.3 Institutional Quality  
 
nstitutional Quality, as a potentially important determinant of RES and, additionally, from 
suspected importance in relationship with (governmental) decentralization, is introduced 
into the model as a variable, constructed from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
rating by the PRS Group. The PRS Group provides ratings for 140 countries on a monthly basis, 
and for an additional 26 countries on an annual basis – for the time period from 1984 until now. 
The rating comprises 22 variables in three subcategories of risk; political, financial, and economic. 
The subcategory of Political Risk includes 12 weighted variables covering both political and social 
attributes from which the Institutional Quality Index (IQ) is artificially constructed. The choice of 
dimensions follows Buzar (2020) and Law et al. (2015), which include; Government Stability, 
Corruption, Law and Order, Democratic Accountability and Bureaucratic Quality. These measures 
are rescaled from their original range to newly range between 0 and 10 and then added up to the 




3.1.4 Control Variables 
 
he previous literature section of the study derived several groups of potential 
determinants of RE deployment. My study includes at least one variable for each of the 
discussed groups. First, socio-economic determinants. Here, as in the majority of empirical 
studies, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in constant 2010 US$, is included in per capita terms. 
Additionally, the net inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) – in percentage terms of GDP – is 
deployed. The demographic dimension is covered by the inclusion of the country’s Population. 
Next to these socio-economic variables, a measure regarding the environmental dimension is 
included, namely the amount CO2 emissions in tons and, again, in per capita terms. To represent 
energy sector characteristics, three parameters are introduced; the share of electricity generated 
from fossil fuel energy sources – as  the percentage of the total electricity generation – the share of 




consumption – in billion kWh. Data on Population, GDP per capita, CO2 Emissions, Foreign Direct 
and Investment (FDI) are retrieved from the World Bank Database (World Bank, 2021). 
Additionally, to control for regulatory characteristics, two dummy variables are included 
in the analysis. First, a variable for the implementation of a Feed-in Tariff (FIT) Policy and, second, 
a variable depicting the implementation of a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) Policy. Both 
policies are designed to reduce investors’ risk by artificially creating long-term markets, although 
they try to achieve this goal by different means. The FIT policy provides RES electricity producers 
with preferential prices per unit of generation (kWh) over a previously established time period – 
e.g. 10 to 15 years. This allows investors to securely recover their investments over time and, 
additionally, reduces the competitional disadvantage of RES technologies, if such exhibit too large 
investment costs. The RPS policies, on the other hand, establish a “quota systems” or mandates 
rather than financial incentives. If such policy is ratified, it requires that electricity utilities 
generate a previously specified percentage of their total generation or sales from RES. Most 
commonly, such percentual requirements start with small targets in the early years, but then raise 
these targets to higher values until the terminal year. The annual RPS benchmarks are then 
translated into individual generation levels that must be reached. Both variables take the value 1, 
if either of the policies is implemented in a given country, in a given year. The data regarding RE 
policies is based on two sources. The data is primarily based on Carley et al. (2016) which analyze 
the effects of different determinants on the RE development, inter alia the effect of feed-in tariffs 
and renewable portfolio standards. For this purpose, the authors conduct a comprehensive source 
and literature review in order to determine (if existing) the implementation year and application 
period of the two policies for a wide range of countries. An overview is presented in the paper and 
depicts the main source of information. As the authors conduct the review on the time-period 
between 1990 and 2010, this information is complemented by information from the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) for the years between 2010 and 2016, more precisely from the Policies and 
Measures Database (IEA, 2021). The detailed information can be found in Table 18 of the Online 
Supplementary Material. 
Finally, the variable Annex B is introduced in the analysis, not as an additional control 
variable but rather as a proxy for a country’s commitment to fight climate change. This proxy is 
introduced when analyzing the effect of the above discussed policies on the RE deployment. The 
variable takes the value 1 from 1998, if a country is part of the Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol – 
only including countries which ratified the protocol together with binding emission reduction 
targets. The year 1998 hereby depicts the ratification year of the Kyoto Protocol. The list of 
countries ratifying the Kyoto Protocol with binding emission reduction targets can be found in the 
Annex B of the agreement (United Nations, 1998). 
 
 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics  
 
igure 1 presents the development of the Share of RES over the investigated time period. For 
this purpose, the yearly averages of the global sample, but also of the regional sub-samples 
are shown. It is clearly visible that during the first years, about 1990 to 1995, there is almost 
no clear increasing trend. This characteristic can be explained by the rather late introduction of 
new RES technologies for the broader market during the 1990’s. Even the Kyoto Protocol, as the 
first international agreement, dates back to 1998. Pioneer in the promotion of new RES 
technologies was Germany which ratified the worldwide first FIT policy in 1990 (Klein et al., 
2007). From 1995, though, a clear increasing trend can be seen in the data. The share of RES of 
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the global sample increased from about 3% to about 12%, which is outdone only from Europe, 
increasing the share to about 17%.  
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the main variables of interest, that are the 
alternative measures of RE deployment, the RAI, the IQ Index and GDP per capita as an indicator 
for the income-level heterogeneity of the sample. The results show that the overall mean share of 
the total sample is 5% and that the share ranges quite a lot between 0% and about 70%. The RAI 
also shows a large overall variation of about 10 index points, ranging from 0 to 37 – which is 
actually outside the range of the RAI. These values can be reached though, as the example of 
Germany shows, which has a mean of 36 index points – qualified by the higher number of sub-
national tiers and the with it associated higher potential scoring (Hooghe et al., 2016).  
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 (Share of RES) (RES pc) (Abs. RES) (RAI) (IQ) (GDP pc) 
Mean 0.054 344.122 8.972 11.672 33.277 20269.08 
Median 0.018 53.618 0.905 9.812 32.153 10214.05 
Maximum 0.693 15153.48 323.328 37.672 49.167 90029.36 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 6.528 411.165 
Std. Dev. 0.085 1179.785 29.759 10.249 9.138 19792.95 
Obs. 378 378 378 378 378 378 
 
Compared to the RAI, the IQ does not contain countries with 0 levels of institutional quality – 
whether starting from about 6.5 index points. The RAI, on the other hand, consists of countries 
indeed showing no level of decentralization at all – e.g. El Salvador and Jamaica. The statistics of 
GDP per capita impressively show that the here employed sample contains of a wide range of 
developing and developed countries – ranging from only $US 411 to about $US 90,000 per 
inhabitant. More detailed summary statistics are presented in Table 7 of the Appendix. 
 




Figure 2 shows the preliminary correlation between decentralization and RE deployment, and 
institutional quality and the RE deployment, respectively. For this purpose, the individual panel 
average values of the variables are presented in a scatterplot. Regarding the level of 
decentralization and the connected share of RES, the relationship is rather indistinct. Although, a 
 17 
potentially increasing pattern could be identified in the lower half of the graph, outliers – with low 
levels of decentralization and high levels of RE deployment – are biasing the overall relationship. 
Examples for such outliers could be centrally governed countries like Iceland or El Salvador, with 
simultaneously high levels of RE development. Consequently, the linear fit of the two variables 
even shows a negative slope or rather sign. The preliminary relationship between the institutional 
quality and RES, on the other hand, shows a more distinct distribution. A clear positive slope or 
rather relationship between IQ and RES can be seen, giving first indications of the relevance of the 
IQ for the RE transition. Some “outliers” such as Denmark with one of the highest levels of 
institutional quality even shows a disproportionately strong level of RE deployment – represented 
by the most upper and right data-point. Overall, the introductory descriptive analysis indicates a 
first potentially positive relationship between the two main variables of interest and the RE 
deployment, but simultaneously emphasize the heterogeneity of the employed sample and the 
connected issues regarding the isolation of a general impact. 
 
 
3.3 Empirical Specification 
 
he primary purpose of this study is to examine the promoting effect of (governmental) 
decentralization on the RE deployment. For this purpose the following model is specified: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑍𝑖𝑡
9
𝑗=1
+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                          (1) 
, where ln𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡  represents the different measures for electricity generated from renewable 
sources in logarithmic form.7 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑖𝑡  is the Regional Authority Index, the deployed measure of the 
level of decentralization, as well in logarithmic form. Z𝑖𝑡  denotes the set of Control Variables, 
including controls regarding socio-economic, environmental, energy sector and policy 
characteristics of the individual countries. The included socio-economic variables are; the log of 
GDP per capita (𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡), the log of the ratio of Foreign Direct Investment over GDP (𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡) and 
the log of Population (𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡). Regarding environmental characteristics, CO2 per capita (𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑂2𝑖𝑡) 
emissions are introduced into the model in logs. Finally, the log of the ratio of electricity generated 
from Fossil Fuels (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡), the log of the ratio of Electricity Imports (𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐼𝑖𝑡) and the log of the Total 
Electricity Consumption (𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡) are employed to control for energy sector characteristics. In a 
following separate analysis the influence of RE Policies in connection with Kyoto Protocol Annex B 
countries is examined, namely the effect of Renewable Portfolio Standards (𝑅𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡) and Feed-in 
Tariffs (𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡), both incorporated as dummy variables. The subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑡 indicate the 
individual country and time-period, respectively, with 𝑡 = 1990, 1995, … , 2015 measured in five-
year intervals. The parameters 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜏𝑡  represent Country Fixed Effects and Time Fixed Effects, 
respectively, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is the error term. 𝛽1 is the coefficient of interest, expected to be positive and 
henceforth verifying a positive effect of decentralization on the RE development.  
 Following the previous theoretical argumentation, the influence of Institutional Quality 
and, more importantly, its connection and interdependency with (governmental) decentralization 
is suspected to additionally play a significant role when investigating the impact of 
 
7 Excluding electricity generated from hydro-electric power generation facilities.  
T
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decentralization on the RE deployment. To incorporate this issue into the existing empirical 
strategy, the model is extended as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑥𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑍𝑖𝑡
9
𝑗=1
+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡             (2) 
In this specification, the effect of the regional authority index on the RE deployment is given by: 
𝜕𝑅𝐸𝑆
𝜕𝑅𝐴𝐼
= 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡                                                                    (3) 
Hence, the impact of RAI on the RES varies with the level of institutional quality positively as 
hypothesized in the study. The static model specifications of (1) and (2) are estimated by a Fixed 




4. Empirical Findings 
 
ection 4 presents the empirical findings of the study. First, the main results based on the 
previously derived equations (1) and (2) are shown and discussed. Following, a sub-section 
presents the results of a further investigation on the heterogenous impact of 
decentralization on the RE deployment, more specifically, analyzing the relationship of the effect 
of RAI with the level of development. Finally, estimation results of additional robustness analyses 
are presented, illuminating the effect of alternative outcome variables, as well as discussing the 
role of RE policies for the impact of RAI on RES. The main results are shown and discussed in the 
main text, whereas additional findings are reported in the Appendix. 
 
 
4.1 Main Results 
 
he results of the estimation of equations (1) and (2) are discussed in this section. Table 3 
presents the estimation results of the coefficients and significance levels of the parameters 
of interest – which are the impact of (governmental) decentralization, institutional quality 
and their interaction term. In case of equation (3), the Average Marginal Effect (AME) as well as 
the estimated effect at different points of the institutional quality distribution are also reported. 
The detailed results are presented in Table 10 of the Appendix.  
Column (1) depicts the results of the simplest model specification, not controlling for any 
type of potential influences. The estimated coefficient of RAI is expectedly counterintuitive, but 
significant at 5% significance level. Following, Column (2) controls for unobserved country 
heterogeneity by applying the Fixed Effects (FE) Estimator. Here, the coefficient of RAI remains 
significant at 5% and takes the value of 1.033, implying that a 1% increase in the level of 
decentralization would imply a 1.03 % increase in the share of RES. Column (3), on the other hand, 
additionally controls for Time Fixed Effects. Note here, that the coefficient of RAI stays relatively 
stable at about 1.04 and significant at a 5% level. In turn, Model (4) introduces the first sub-set of 
control variables, more specifically, the socio-economic controls. They seem to capture some of 




is robust to the introduction socio-economic controls and unobserved country heterogeneity, as 
well as to time effects. 
 
Table 3 Estimation of the Effect of Decentralization. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
lnRAI -0.205** 1.033** 1.044** 0.805* 0.979* 0.936** 0.982** 0.530 
 (0.087) (0.421) (0.451) (0.475) (0.530) (0.429) (0.451) (2.178) 
lnIQ 
      
-0.796 -0.988 
       (1.119) (1.361) 
lnRAIxlnIQ 
       
0.137 
        (0.636) 
AME 
       
1.002** 
        (0.462) 
Marginal Effects at:        
IQ (10%) 
      
0.959** 
       (0.475) 
IQ (25%) 
      
0.978** 
       (0.459) 
IQ (50%) 
      
1.004** 
       (0.463) 
IQ (75%) 
      
1.040** 
       (0.520) 
IQ (90%) 
      
1.051* 
       (0.545)          
Country FE 
 
x x x x x x x 
Time FE 
  
x x x x x x 
Socio-Econ. Controls 
  
x x x x x 
Environm. Control 
   
x x x x 
Energy Sctr Controls 
    
x x x 
N 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 
Log-Likelihood -837.909 -755.989 -753.382 -734.533 -725.172 -714.803 -714.085 -714.027 
AIC 1679.817 1513.978 1518.765 1487.066 1470.344 1455.606 1456.169 1458.053 
R2 (within) 0.014 0.032 0.045 0.136 0.177 0.221 0.224 0.224 
Dependent Variable Share of RES. Clustered (by country) standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * show 
statistically significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. IQ (p%) denotes the value of the p-percentile of the distribution 
of IQ. 
 
When additionally including CO2 emissions into the estimation, as a control for the 
environmental conditions, the RAI coefficient is changing quite noticeable (back) to the previously 
established range of about 1, as can be observed in Column (5). Finally, Column (6) additionally 
introduces control variables related to the energy sector. Still, a positive effect of decentralization 
on the RE development is confirmed even after the inclusion of a comprehensive list of controls 
and country unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
So far, the specifications have not included the impact of IQ on RES. As indicated in Section 2, the 
quality of the institutional framework may have an impact on RE deployment and it can also 
moderate the effect that RAI has on RES. To explore this, Column (7) reports the results when IQ 
is added as an additional regressor whereas Column (8) shows the estimation of the specification 
that also adds the interaction between the two factors. As previously mentioned, in the latter case 
the AME is reported along the estimates of the coefficients. In addition, the effect of RAI for 
different levels of institutional quality are calculated and additionally presented in Column (8). 
The AME is significant at 5% and takes the value of 1.002, verifying a significant and (similarly) 
strong impact (on average) of RAI on RES – such as in the previous specifications. The coefficient 
of RAI at the sample’s 10% level of institutional quality is, compared to the previous coefficients, 
slightly lower – with about 0.959 – and significant. The coefficient at the sample’s 25% level of 
institutional quality is increased to about 0.978. At the following levels of institutional quality the 
coefficients are increasing from 1.004 to 1.05 – values in range of the previously determined single 
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effect of decentralization. Furthermore, all coefficients are significant at a 5% significance level. 
Column (8) depicts the preferred specification, as it is controlling for a comprehensive set of 
controls and potential influences, but also shows the highest explanatory power and 
corresponding lowest AIC. Overall, the results imply that there indeed exists a strong promoting 
effect of (governmental) decentralization on the RE development. Furthermore, the relationship 
and interdependency between the level of decentralization and institutional quality is shown.  In 
other words, decentralization is also dependent on the quality of country institutions, as the 
promoting effect is increasing with higher levels of IQ. 
The presented coefficients and the related significance levels of the included controls in 
Table 10 of the Appendix show the high correlation and potential collinearity of the economic and 
environmental dimensions – in the form of highly significant, large and opposing coefficients of 
GDP and the share of fossil fuel electricity in the mix. This relationship was captured by CO2 
emissions in the model specification without energy sector variables. The positive sign for GDP 
and negative sign for the share of FDI are as expected from the literature review – although FDI 
not being significant – GDP, on the other hand, is highly significant. The coefficient related to the 
share of electricity imports has the expected and previously derived negative sign, but is not 
significant, as well. The coefficient related to the electricity consumption shows a negative sign 
which seems to be an indication for consumption variations over time too large to be solely driven 
by RES expansions.  
 
 
4.2 Does the impact of Decentralization vary with Development? 
 
fter the initial validation of the promoting effect of decentralization on the RE deployment 
on a larger scale, a subsequent investigation and discussion regarding potential 
heterogeneous impacts of the parameters of interest seems appropriate. One important 
insight to be investigated is the influence of the level of development on the effect of 
decentralization. Here, in case of developing countries, the impact of decentralization and its 
mechanisms can potentially differ, compared to developed or rather higher-income countries. 
Although, the reasoning behind processes of decentralization might be the same as for developed 
countries, local accountability structures may not be as advanced and regional or municipal 
governments may be strongly dependent on “local power elites”, in case of developing countries 
(Bardhan, 2002). These differences, inspired by the literature about the impact of decentralization 
on economic growth, could also potentially influence the effect of decentralization on the RE 
deployment, leading to deviating results. To investigate this potential heterogenous impact, in 
which the interdependency with institutional quality seems to occupy a central role, the countries 
of the sample are grouped according to the income levels, using the World Bank taxonomy – i.e.: 
high income, upper middle income, lower middle income and low income. The distribution of 
countries regarding this classifications is shown in detail in Table 6 of the Appendix. Based on this 
classification, the countries are further clustered into high income, consisting of high and upper 
middle income economies, and low income, consisting of low and lower middle income countries. 
Table 4 presents the estimation results of the high and low income groups. The first 
column depicts the previously derived preferred specification with both variables of interest and 
the interaction term, all control variables and the effect of RAI at different levels of institutional 
quality – estimated with the total (global) sample. The second column shows the results when 
estimating this preferred specification with high and upper middle income countries only. 
Compared to the estimated effects using the full sample, the effects of RAI are significant from the 
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10% percentile of IQ on. All in all, the variation of the estimated effects of RAI along the 
distribution of IQ in the sample of high income countries more or less reproduces the estimates 
of the whole sample, but shows decreasing rather than increasing coefficients of RAI along 
increasing levels of IQ.8 This could imply that the impact of decentralization declines in the highest 
levels of institutional quality. Nevertheless, a significant and robust influence of decentralization 
and institutional quality is verified for the subset of developed countries. 
 
Table 4 Differences between High & Low Income Countries. 






lnRAI 0.530 1.402 -3.933 
 (2.178) (2.783) (6.138) 
lnIQ -0.988 -2.074 0.597 
 (1.361) (1.319) (5.787) 
lnRAIxlnIQ 0.137 -0.130 1.223 
 (0.636) (0.758) (1.907) 
AME 1.002** 0.944* -0.048 
 (0.462) (0.499) (1.215) 
Marginal Effects at:    
IQ (10%) 0.959** 0.985* -0.632 
 (0.475) (0.579) (1.494) 
IQ (25%) 0.978** 0.968* -0.128 
 (0.459) (0.536) (1.217) 
IQ (50%) 1.004** 0.937* 0.039 
 (0.463) (0.496) (1.227) 
IQ (75%) 1.040** 0.914* 0.167 
 (0.520) (0.508) (1.271) 
IQ (90%) 1.051* 0.906* 0.294 




Country FE x x x 
Time FE x x x 
Socio-Economic Controls x x x 
Environmental Control x x x 
Energy Sector Controls x x x 
N 378 306 72 
Log-Likelihood -714.027 -552.696 -142.011 
AIC 1458.053 1135.392 306.023 
R2 (within) 0.224 0.107 0.437 
Dependent Variable Share of RES. Clustered (by country) standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * show statistically significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. IQ (p%) denotes the value of the p-percentile of the distribution of IQ. 
 
The third column, in turn, shows the results for the preferred specification estimated on the sub-
sample of developing countries. Interestingly, here the estimates of the effect of RAI are all far 
below the previously estimated parameters and insignificant. Even in case of the highest 
percentiles of institutional quality the coefficients are only between 0.06 and 0.08, implying 
almost no enhancing effect of decentralization on the RE development – provided the impact was 
significant. The results imply that the overall enhancing effect of decentralization appears to be 
rather driven by developed countries and seems to additionally support the conclusion of 
Bardhan (2002) on the deviating effect of decentralization in case of developing countries. As 
emphasized before, the interaction of decentralization with institutional quality is from crucial 
relevance when investigating the promoting effect of (governmental) decentralization on the RE 
deployment. The identified potential differences in democratic accountability and corruption – i.e. 
dependency on local elites – as causes for the deviating impact of decentralization in developing 
countries verify the importance of institutional quality for the mechanism, as both dimensions – 
 
8 In case of the sub-sample estimations related to different levels of development, the percentiles are in relation to the sub-samples’ 
averages, not the global ones. 
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democratic accountability and corruption – are central components of the here deployed IQ index. 
Indeed, the figures reported in Table 9 of the Appendix  this conjecture appears to be verified. The 
level of decentralization is, on average, higher in developed than in developing countries, but, 
more importantly, also the level of institutional quality is substantially higher in developed 
countries. The results imply that the enhancing effect of (governmental) decentralization seems 




4.3 Robustness Analysis 
 
s discussed in the data section, the empirical literature on the determinants of RES utilizes 
different measures for the RE deployment. This allows for an additional robustness check 
by using different RES measures as dependent variables. Table 11 of the Appendix  
presents the results of this robustness analysis. The first column shows the preferred model 
specification from the main empirical analysis, with the Share of RES as the dependent variable. 
The following column presents the results of the preferred model specification with the 
Absolute RES Generation (in billion kWh) as dependent variable. Using RES generation as the 
dependent variable can be interpreted as analyzing the effect of decentralization on the general 
RE deployment, as the measure, generally, does not take into account other determining 
dimensions, as the before discussed variable of Share of RES. The results indeed seem to verify 
the previously presented outcome, as the effects of RAI at different levels of IQ are shown to be 
significant. The effect of decentralization appears to be robust when analyzing the effect on the 
absolute RE development.  
Finally, the last column employs RES per Capita or rather RE electricity generation per 
inhabitant as the dependent variable. Although this measure indeed incorporates the country’s 
population, it does not relate the derived per capita RES generation to the total electricity 
generation or the remaining energy sources in the electricity mix. Consequently, the measure is 
restrictively reliable as a measure of RE deployment and changes in the measure are conditionally 
meaningful. The results of the robustness check, too, seem to support this argumentation, as the 
marginal effects of decentralization are insignificant at all significance levels and all percentiles of 
institutional quality. 
 
Additionally, the influence of RE policies on the deployment of RES is investigated. As previously 
discussed, the RE transition is characterized and largely dependent on public policies promoting 
the deployment of RES, justifying this separate and more detailed analysis. Therefore, the aim of 
this analysis is to check whether the main results are robust to the inclusion of specific RE policies, 
as it could be the case that such policies capture significant parts of the impact of RAI and IQ, due 
to a potentially strong collinearity – as “better” countries potentially also implement policies 
aiming to increase RE deployment. 
The impacts of the two most commonly implemented policies, namely RPS and FIT 
policies, are shown in Table 12 of the Appendix. Column (8), as before, depicts the preferred 
specification. Subsequently, Column (9) additionally introduces both RE policies as explanatory 
variables. The coefficients are quite large, with 0.706 and 0.628 for renewable portfolio standards 
and feed-in tariffs, respectively, although with the coefficient of FIT not being significant at any 
significance level. The coefficient of RPS, on the other hand, is significant at a 10% level. These 
results imply a globally positive and significant, even though weakly significant, impact of the RPS 
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policy on the RE deployment. And, indeed, the AME and the marginal effects of RAI at different 
levels of IQ show (slightly) lower coefficients and weaker significance – first indications of the 
discussed potential relationship. The subsequent Column (10) tries to capture the additional 
influence of a country’s commitment on the effect of the RE policies and the deployment of RES in 
general. For this purpose Annex B is included in the specification, together with interaction terms 
of the individual RE policies with Annex B. As the variable of Annex B is identifying countries 
which committed to binding emission reduction targets in cause of the Kyoto Protocol, the 
variable is utilized as a proxy of “commitment to the cause”. And, indeed, the single coefficient of 
Annex B is quite large and significant. More interestingly though, the marginal effect of the FIT 
policy in interaction with Annex B becomes significant, compared to an insignificant combined 
impact of the RPS policy and Annex B. Tables 15 to 17 of the Online Supplementary Material show 
the distribution of Annex B countries and FIT and RPS policies by income. Analyzing these tables 
shows that the result might be caused by the fact that Annex B countries are almost exclusively 
developed or rather high income countries, based on the idea of the industrialized countries 
taking responsibility for their historic contribution to global emissions and henceforth global 
warming. FIT policies, too, are mainly implemented in higher income countries, potentially caused 
by the connected costs. These factors could cause the strong and significant effect of FIT policies, 
in combination with Annex B countries, on the RE deployment. The marginal effects of 
decentralization seem to verify this conclusion. The coefficients are substantially lower compared 
to the preferred specification and overall less significant. Furthermore, the coefficients decrease 
with increasing levels of IQ, potentially implying that the effects of RAI on RES at higher levels of 
IQ are partly (or better) captured by the newly introduced RE policies and their interaction with 
Annex B countries – as these countries potentially show higher levels of institutional quality. All 






The human impact on the environment and climate is growing at an alarming speed. 
Anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have increased since the pre-industrial era and 
reached unprecedented levels in recent history. The increased concentration of anthropogenetic 
CO2 in the atmosphere is the main driver of global warming, causing increased occurrences of 
floods, rising sea levels and a general loss of biodiversity. International efforts to limit global 
warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels are undertaken, with the key measure to reduce GHG 
emissions. The energy sector, including electricity and heat production, as one of the largest 
emitting economic sectors emphasizes the crucial relevance of the mitigation of emissions in the 
sector by deploying energy from renewable sources (RES) – shedding the focus on the 
determinants of the underlying renewable energy (RE) transition. 
 The decentralizing and policy-driven character of this RE transition stresses the relevance 
of the institutional framework for the development of RES, leading to the main hypothesis of the 
study that (governmental) decentralization, in combination with institutional quality, has a 
promoting effect on the RE deployment – mainly based on mechanisms concerning efficiency, 
democratization and regional policy. Compared to previous literature on the relationship between 
decentralization and RE deployment which investigated the link on a substantially smaller scale 
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– either analyzing a single country or a small (homogenous) group of countries – and purely 
focused on measures of fiscal decentralization, this study not only significantly increases the scale 
of research, but also deploys a more comprehensive and holistic measure of (governmental) 
decentralization – i.e. the Regional Authority Index. The study employs a panel data set containing 
of 63 developing and developed countries over the time-period between 1990 and 2015, including 
countries from broader Europe, Asia, Oceania and the Americas. 
 The empirical findings seem to verify the previously discussed enhancing effect of 
(governmental) decentralization on the RE development and, additionally, highlight the crucial 
interconnection with the dimension of institutional quality. The promoting effect seems to unfold 
from above average levels of institutional quality – identified by the analysis on the potential 
heterogeneity of the impact of RAI on RES. Developing countries, with lower levels of IQ – 
compared to developed countries – seem to not profit from decentralization. However, the general 
effect of decentralization seems to be conditionally robust to alternative specifications of the 
outcome variable and to the inclusion of the most common RE policies. Hence, previous empirical 
research on the promoting impact of (governmental) decentralization may potentially overstate 
the effect, due to smaller and more homogenous research settings. When allowing for more 
heterogeneity in the sample and, additionally, employing a more comprehensive measure of 
decentralization the estimated effect is still significant, but has to be taken with at least some 
precaution, due to conditionally robust findings. A result which strongly emphasizes further 
research on the relationship. 
 
 
5.1 Policy Implications 
 
he policy implications which can be derived from the findings are mainly twofold. On the 
one hand, as already indicated by earlier research and conditionally validated by the 
present investigation for a broader scale, the process of decentralization and the 
connected delegation of political, financial and administrative autonomy to sub-central tiers to 
enhance the participation and involvement of citizens, but also local und municipal authorities 
seem to enhance the RE deployment. Consequently, decisionmakers should promote the process 
of decentralization, either in a general application or specifically oriented to the energy and 
electricity sector, supporting the discussed new forms of decentralized energy systems and 
ownerships. The second, and potentially more significant, implication which can be derived from 
the here presented study is the importance of the institutional quality in connection with 
(governmental) decentralization. As shown, decentralization merely develops a promoting effect 
on the RE deployment, if it is accompanied by high(er) levels of institutional quality. Therefore, 
the process of decentralization needs to be supported by measures with the aim to increase IQ. 
This implication is from particular relevance for developing countries with substantially lower 
levels of IQ. In order to benefit from decentralization, policymakers are required to promote both 








5.2 Discussion of some caveats of the Study 
 
here is one significant drawback related to the data and several potential issues related to 
the econometric strategy which need to be discussed in more detail. First, as mentioned 
already in the data section, the Regional Authority Index is exhibiting a crucial drawback, 
as it is not covering any African country. Although, technically speaking, the African continent is 
continuously taking a minor role in the global economic activity, especially compared to Europe 
and North-America, but also compared to other emerging and developing regions like Asia or 
South-America, the continent is indeed facing sustained economic growth over the last decades. 
As pointed out in the introduction, economic development, but also population growth – 
particularly relevant for the African continent – are known to be the main driver of the rising GHG 
emission levels, which consequently emphasizes an increased interest also for Africa. Its part in 
the global climate crisis and its avoidance cannot be neglected, calling for a better understanding 
of the economic and RE conditions, respectively. Especially, from an energy point of view the 
continent exhibits interesting peculiarities and developments, such as the reliance on 
decentralized energy systems due to general energy accessibility issues and ongoing deficiencies 
of large-scale or rather centralized energy systems (Zalengera et al., 2020, p. 272). This is, on the 
other hand, one reason for the limited data availability and accuracy, as much of the energy 
demand is still produced locally and without sophisticated power grids – a major issue when 
trying to include African countries in such analyses. The lack of African countries due to the 
limited data availability of the RAI depicts a limitation of this study which will be addressed in my 
future research. 
 
Regarding the econometric dimension, there are three main issues which potentially cause 
endogeneity; an omitted variable bias, a measurement error bias and a reverse causality bias. 
These concerns need to be addressed. To offset the first potential issue, the omitted variable bias, 
this study employs a comprehensive set of controls. As shown in the previous empirical analysis 
and theoretically derived in the literature part, control variables for all major RE determinant 
groups are introduced – i.e. socio-economic, environmental, energy sector and demographic 
determinants. But also, the relationship and interdependency of decentralization with other 
dimensions, particularly with income, need to be accounted for by the inclusion of corresponding 
controls to ultimately capture the pure impact of decentralization on the RE deployment (Bodman 
& Hodge, 2010). The relatively stable coefficients of RAI, depending on the employed set of 
controls, can be interpreted as a supporting indication that the individual effect of the impact of 
decentralization is captured by the specified model. Additionally, the country and time fixed effects 
control for other unobserved effects – specific to the individual country or as common 
international shocks –, allowing to neglect this potential bias with high confidence. 
 In terms of a bias arising from measurement error, several comments have to be made 
regarding the quality of the deployed Regional Authority Index. First, in my opinion with respect 
to previous research lies on the usage of different measures of fiscal decentralization, either in 
form of the share of sub-central revenues and expenditures or in form of the share of sub-central 
tax revenues. The already mentioned Chinese-style decentralization, with its highly decentralized 
fiscal, but rather centralized top-down governance system (Zhang, 2006), exemplary shows the 
shortcoming of only fiscally focused measures, as sub-national fiscal freedom is not necessarily 
accompanied by administrative or political freedom. As the main mechanisms through which 
governmental decentralization potentially influences the RE development are dependent on 
regional self-rule and political freedom, the deployment of the RAI seems more appropriate than 
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solely fiscal oriented measures. Here, the RAI offers a more holistic approach, better capturing the 
different dimensions of (governmental) decentralization. Additionally, Harguindéguy et al. (2019) 
state in their literature review on the variety of decentralization indexes that the RAI is one of the 
few indexes which fulfill certain validity criteria.9 More specifically, the RAI is verified regarding 
its convergent and content validity. The former compares the results of two (or more) 
instruments in order to verify if the results converge – despite their deviating methodologies. The 
latter, on the other hand, compares the way scholar define the same concept and, additionally, the 
way how to calculate it. Concluding, the authors unambiguously  favor the RAI, providing “a clear 
definition of the concept of decentralization” (Harguindéguy et al., 2019, p.18). Both comments 
indicate a strong support for the usage of the RAI as an indicator of (governmental) 
decentralization and emphasize the quality, validity and accuracy of the index, limiting concerns 
regarding potential measurement error bias. 
 Additionally, next to the just described and discussed causes of endogeneity, reverse 
causality potentially imposes limitations to the conducted empirical investigation. I have  
addressed this issue by conducting additional regressions, in which the RE deployment is 
regressed on the lagged values of the parameters of interest, ensuring the one-directional 
estimation of the impact of decentralization on RES. The results are shown in Table 13 of the 
Appendix which confirm the findings of the previous estimations, indicating a stable and robust 
effect of (governmental) decentralization on the RE development. Still, it can be argued that 
lagging the regressors will not solve the concerns of reverse causality, if they are strongly 
persistent. Hence, a potential solution to the problem is the usage of instruments in the course of 
an instrumental variable (IV) approach. This method is shown to be challenging in the case of 
(governmental) decentralization, as there do not exist simple and easily available instruments to 
employ. Discussed determinants of decentralization in the literature are mostly related to ethnical 
and geographical dimensions. The Geographic Fragmentation Index (GFI) from Canavire-
Bacarreza et al. (2020), imposes advanced data requirements and demanding computations, 
hindering straightforward deployment of such in the course of this master’s thesis. Nevertheless, 
I have conducted two attempts of the employment of instruments. 
First, the just mentioned GFI and, second, an Ethnic Fractionalization Index (EFI). The GFI 
describes the weighted probability that two randomly taken individuals do not live in similar 
altitude zones, being the weight matrix specified as the average distance between altitudes. This 
index therefore captures the geographical diversity of a country which can be reflected on the 
pattern of population settlements potentially leading to different preferences in institutional 
designs (Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2020). In the paper, the authors present the GFI for their 
sample for the year 2012 – containing all countries of the here conducted study. To use the GFI as 
an instrument, I have interacted the index with time dummies to create over-time variation. 
The EFI depicts the probability that two randomly drawn individuals within a country do 
not belong to the same ethnic group (Drazanova, 2019) and the data is retrieved from the 
Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset (HIEF), available for 165 countries across all 
continents and covers the period between 1945 and 2013 on an annual basis. To be able to deploy 
the whole time period of the sample, the EFI values for 2015 are assumed to be the values of 2013 
from the HIEF data set.10 
 
9 In this context, validity “refers to the degree to which an instrument of observation measures what it aims to measure” 
(Harguindéguy et al., 2019, p.17). 
10 Additionally, Bahamas, Brunei, Iceland, India, France, Malta, Papua New Guinea and Suriname are dropped as the EFI does not 
contain data on these countries. 
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The results are shown in Table 14 of the Appendix. The first column represents the 
preferred specification of the study, the second column shows the results when applying an IV 
approach with the EFI and the third column with the GFI as the main instrument. Although, the IV 
estimation of the effect of RAI are quite similar to those reported in Column (8) of Table 3, the 
impact is not found to be significant for all the percentiles of IQ. The estimation of the effect when 
using the GFI as instrument, on the other hand, are shown to be highly significant at all levels of 
institutional quality, but exhibit rather large magnitudes – between 2.5 and 3.0. It is pivotal to note 
at this stage that both instruments are found to be invalid, implied by the clear rejection of the 
null hypotheses of Hansen J Test. This could explain the unrealistic and insignificant findings of 
the IV estimations and emphasizes the necessity of future research to address this issue and to 
find appropriate instruments.  
 
Finally, the characteristics of the here employed dataset potentially allow for a more time-series 
oriented analysis of the relationship between decentralization and RE development – as applied 
in previous literature on this relationship. The here conducted analysis avoids issues related to 
time-series properties by exploiting five year intervals, but as the data is available on an annual 
basis, a more detailed analysis of the time-series attributes and the utilization of the accordingly 
appropriate estimation approaches is feasible. Preliminary results indeed indicate the existence 
of stationarity and, more importantly, cointegration in the panel – albeit heterogeneously located 
across the sample. This leaves room for subsequent research on the analysis of this particular 
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Table 5 Grouping by Region. 
Europe 
Austria Belgium Cyprus Denmark Finland 
France Germany Greece Iceland Ireland 
Italy Malta Netherlands Norway Portugal 
Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom 
Israel     
     
Asia 
Bangladesh Brunei China India Indonesia 
Japan Malaysia Pakistan Philippines Singapore 
South Korea Sri Lanka Thailand Vietnam  
     
Oceania 
Australia New Zealand Papua New Guinea  
     
North America 
Canada Mexico United States  
     
Central & South America 
Argentina Bahamas Bolivia Brazil Chile 
Colombia Costa Rica Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador 
Guatemala Guyana Haiti Honduras Jamaica 
Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Suriname 
Trinidad & Tobago Uruguay    
 
 
Table 6 Grouping by Income Classification (World Bank). 
High Income 
Australia Austria Bahamas Belgium Brunei 
Canada Chile Cyprus Denmark Finland 
France Germany Greece Iceland Ireland 
Israel Italy Japan Malta Netherlands 
New Zealand Norway Panama Portugal Singapore 
South Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom 
Trinidad and Tobago United States Uruguay   
     
Upper Middle Income 
Argentina Brazil China Colombia Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic Ecuador Guatemala Guyana Indonesia 
Jamaica Malaysia Mexico Paraguay Peru 
Suriname Thailand Turkey   
     
Lower Middle Income 
Bangladesh Bolivia El Salvador Honduras India 
Nicaragua Pakistan Papua New Guinea Philippines Sri Lanka 
Vietnam     
     
Low Income 

















Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
RAI Regional Authority Index overall 11.672 10.249 0 37.672 
between 
 
10.075 0 36.125 
within 
 
2.212 -4.788 20.469 
IQ Institutional Quality Index overall 33.277 9.138 6.528 49.167 
between 
 
8.443 13.426 46.968 
within 
 
3.629 16.899 42.113 
GDP pc GDP per capita 
(constant 2010 US$) 
overall 20269.080 19792.950 411.165 90029.360 
between 
 
19483.610 632.802 79740.920 
within 
 
4145.436 494.931 41612.670 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
(% of GDP) 
overall 5.722 21.455 -19.773 339.788 
between 
 
12.283 -5.577 84.151 
within 
 
17.648 -77.251 261.359 
POP Population overall 73,500,000 211,000,000 254,826 1,370,000,000 
between 
 
211,000,000 291,514.8 1,270,000,000 
within 
 
22,800,000 -151,000,000 286,000,000 
CO2 pc Carbon dioxide emissions per 
capita (in kilotons) 
overall 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.010 
between 
 
0.001 0.000 0.007 
within 
 
0.000 -0.001 0.005 
FF Share of Fossil Fuel Electricity 
Generation (% Total Generation) 
overall 56.919 32.555 0.002 100 
between 
 
31.608 0.043 99.992 
within 
 
8.604 14.701 91.948 
EI Share of Electricity Imports 
(% Total Consumption) 
overall 5.113 10.014 0 66.658 
between 
 
9.070 0 51.727 
within 
 
4.370 -14.85531 46.772 
EC Annual Total Electricity 
Consumption (in billion kWh) 
overall 5.448 15.829 0.009 136.051 
between 
 
15.052 0.020 94.843 
within 
 
5.195 -36.207 69.236 
FIT Dummy if Country has enacted a 
Feed-in Tariff policy 
overall 0.241 0.428 0 1 
between  0.217 0 0.833 
within  0.370 -0.593 1.074 
RPS Dummy if Country has enacted a 
Renewable Portfolio Standard 
policy 
overall 0.106 0.308 0 1 
between  0.210 0 0.667 
within  0.226 -0.561 0.939 
Annex B Dummy: 1 from 1998 onwards if 
country is part of Annex B 
overall 0.233 0.423 0 1 
between  0.320 0 0.667 
within  0.279 -0.434 0.566 












World 5.0 11.4 6.6 
Europe 6.4 12.7 7.7 
Asia 2.5 12.7 6.1 
Oceania 6.2 14.7 7.4 
North America 3.5 25.6 7.6 
Central & 
South America 









High Income 5.7 13.0 39.8 
Upper Middle 
Income 
3.1 10.2 27.1 
Lower Middle 
Income 
6.7 10.6 25.6 
Low Income 0.2 5.5 13.4 
 
 
Table 10 Detailed Results. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
lnRAI -0.205** 1.033** 1.044** 0.805* 0.979* 0.936** 0.982** 0.530 
 (0.087) (0.421) (0.451) (0.475) (0.530) (0.429) (0.451) (2.178) 
lnIQ 
      
-0.796 -0.988 
       (1.119) (1.361) 
lnRAIxlnIQ 
       
0.137 
        (0.636) 
         
lnGDP    0.846 2.993** 3.611*** 3.517*** 3.481*** 
    (1.495) (1.380) (1.285) (1.266) (1.253) 
lnFDI    -0.164 -0.169 -0.154 -0.134 -0.136 
    (0.162) (0.148) (0.140) (0.128) (0.125) 
lnPOP    -9.075*** -6.800*** -5.259* -5.038 -5.064 
    (2.416) (2.556) (3.143) (3.091) (3.067) 
lnCO2     -2.527** -0.661 -0.534 -0.521 
     (0.953) (1.040) (1.067) (1.070) 
lnFF      -0.704*** -0.684*** -0.690*** 
      (0.229) (0.231) (0.241) 
lnEI     -0.095 -0.093 -0.091 
     (0.081) (0.081) (0.082) 
lnEC     -2.211 -2.198 -2.187 
     (1.391) (1.362) (1.351)  
         
Country FE  x x x x x x x 
Time FE   x x x x x x 
N 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 
Log-Likelihood -837.909 -755.989 -753.382 -734.533 -725.172 -714.803 -714.085 -714.027 
AIC 1679.817 1513.978 1518.765 1487.066 1470.344 1455.606 1456.169 1458.053 
R2 (within) 0.014 0.032 0.045 0.136 0.177 0.221 0.224 0.224 
Dependent Variable Share of RES. Clustered (by country) standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * show 











lnRAI 0.530 -1.232 -0.126 
 (2.178) (1.810) (1.351) 
lnIQ -0.988 -1.948 -1.088 
 (1.361) (1.276) (0.784) 
lnRAIxIQ 0.137 0.627 0.102 
 (0.636) (0.544) (0.413) 
AME 1.002** 0.938** 0.226 
 (0.462) (0.427) (0.430) 
Marginal Effect at:    
IQ (10%) 0.959** 0.741* 0.194 
 (0.475) (0.414) (0.406) 
IQ (25%) 0.978** 0.825** 0.208 
 (0.459) (0.411) (0.411) 
IQ (50%) 1.004** 0.945** 0.227 
 (0.463) (0.429) (0.431) 
IQ (75%) 1.040** 1.113** 0.255 
 (0.520) (0.491) (0.480) 
IQ (90%) 1.051* 1.161** 0.262 
 (0.545) (0.515) (0.497) 
    
Country FE x x x 
Time FE x x x 
Socio-Econ. Controls x x x 
Environm. Control x x x 
Energy Sctr Controls x x x 
N 378 378 378 
Log-Likelihood -714.027 -661.713 -539.067 
AIC 1458.053 1353.426 1108.135 
R2 (within) 0.224 0.278 0.523 
Dependent Variable Share of RES. Clustered (by country) standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * show statistically significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 


























Table 12  Impact of RE Policies. 
 
  
(8) (9) (10) 
lnRAI 0.530 0.642 1.000 
 (2.178) (2.139) (2.145) 
lnIQ -0.988 -0.820 -0.454 
 (1.361) (1.314) (1.334) 
lnRAIxlnIQ 0.137 0.077 -0.051 
 (0.636) (0.618) (0.619) 
AME 1.002** 0.908** 0.822* 
 (0.462) (0.457) (0.466) 
Marginal Effect at:    
IQ (10%) 0.959** 0.883* 0.838* 
 (0.475) (0.478) (0.486) 
IQ (25%) 0.978** 0.894* 0.832* 
 (0.459) (0.459) (0.468) 
IQ (50%) 1.004** 0.908** 0.822* 
 (0.463) (0.458) (0.467) 
IQ (75%) 1.040** 0.929* 0.808 
 (0.520) (0.505) (0.514) 
IQ (90%) 1.051* 0.935* 0.804 
 (0.545) (0.527) (0.536) 
    
RPS  0.706* 1.192 
  (.402) (0.783) 
FIT  0.628 0.510 
  (0.430) (0.667) 
Annex B   0.928* 
   (0.511) 
RPSxAnnexB  -1.201 
   (0.836) 
FITxAnnexB   0.194 
   (0.674) 
    
Marginal Effect FITxAnnexB  0.704** 
   (0.341) 
Marginal Effect RPSxAnnexB  -0.009 
   (0.270) 
    
Country FE x x x 
Time FE x x x 
Socio-Economic Controls x x x 
Environmental Control x x x 
Energy Sector Controls x x x 
N 378 378 322 
Log-Likelihood -714.027 -710.046 -707.651 
AIC 1458.053 1454.092 1455.303 
R2 (within) 0.224 0.241 0.250 
Dependent Variable Share of RES. Clustered (by country) standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * show statistically significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 















Table 13 Reverse Causality (RAI & IQ 5 year lagged). 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
lnRAI -0.067 0.989** 1.088** 0.857 0.961* 0.872* 0.983* 0.461 
 (0.092) (0.431) (0.520) (0.551) (0.541) (0.499) (0.502) (2.201) 
lnIQ 
      
-1.609 -1.823 
       (0.948) (1.359) 
lnRAIxlnIQ 
       
0.158 
        (0.632) 
AME        1.009** 
        (0.511) 
Marginal Effect at: 
       
IQ (10%) 
      
0.959* 
       (0.531) 
IQ (25%) 
      
0.980* 
       (0.513) 
IQ (50%) 
      
1.011** 
       (0.511) 
IQ (75%) 
      
1.053* 
       (0.555) 
IQ (90%) 
      
1.065* 
       (0.576)          
Country FE 
 
x x x x x x x 
Time FE 
  
x x x x x x 
Socio-Econ. Cntr. 
  
x x x x x 
Environm. Cntr. 
   
x x x x 
Energy Sctr Cntr. 
    
x x x 
N 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 
Log-Likelihood -674.554 -601.609 -597.600 -587.440 -576.744 -571.979 -568.651 -568.570 
AIC 1353.108 1205.219 1205.199 1190.880 1171.488 1167.957 1163.303 1165.140 
R2 (within) 0.002 0.035 0.059 0.118 0.176 0.201 0.217  0.218 
Dependent Variable Share of RES. Clustered (by country) standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * show 
statistically significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. IQ (p%) denotes the value of the p-percentile of the distribution 
of IQ. 
 







lnRAI -3.216 -0.786 0.114 
 (2.676) (3.866) (3.740) 
lnIQ -3.600* -2.491 -3.163 
 (1.947) (2.340) (2.211) 
lnRAIxlnIQ 1.257 0.614 0.780 
 (0.802) (1.105) (1.050) 
    
IQ (10%) 0.779 1.146 2.568** 
 (0.525) (0.959) (1.187) 
IQ (25%) 0.880* 1.228 2.672** 
 (0.520) (0.927) (1.165) 
IQ (50%) 1.136** 1.345 2.821** 
 (0.541) (0.921) (1.163) 
IQ (75%) 1.484** 1.510 3.031** 
 (0.640) (0.992) (1.218) 
IQ (90%) 1.578** 1.557 3.091** 
 (0.677) (1.028) (1.245) 
    
Country FE x x x 
Time FE x x x 
Socio-Economic Controls x x x 
Environmental Control x x x 
Energy Sector Controls x x x 
N 322 284 322 
Log-Likelihood -610.313 -522.385 -623.287 
AIC 1250.625 1184.769 1402.574 
R2 (within) 0.131 0.338 0.263 
Hansen J Statistic . 52.738*** 47.389*** 
 39 
Dependent Variable Share of RES. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * show statistically significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  IQ (p%) 
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